Item No. 4658353

This very interesting 10-page letter was written in May 1862 by an officer in the Vermont Brigade (2nd through 6th Vermont). It describes, in detail, the Brigade’s action during the Peninsula Campaign on April 16 at Dam No. 1 on the Warwick River, as well as the rivalry between General William T. H. Brooks (commander of the Brigade) and his division commander, General William F. “Baldy” Smith, the latter of whom the author accuses of being “given somewhat to the flask.” Writing to his father, the author opens with talk of overdue pay and shortage of writing materials, but quickly turns to the death of a “Mr. Newton,” whom the author is glad to have heard made his “last great charge.” He then recalls the action two weeks earlier at Dam No. 1, where “Warwick Creek & the charge of the Green Mountain Boys are themes which will not soon be forgotten.” Attempting to take an impartial stance on the actions of General Smith, whom he described as “a man of talent from the highest branch of our military service,” he pointed toward the “combined jealousy of all the other Generals,” who would “seize upon” any misstep “with all the venom & maliciousness of envious partisans who feel conscious of their own inferiority & are ready to avail themselves of any means to crush their rival.” The author then, however, acknowledged that Smith “is given somewhat to the flask,” but didn’t believe it was drunkenness that had caused the General to order the Vermont Brigade “into the snare” at Dam No. 1. The author doesn’t blame the brigade commander, Brooks, either, describing Brooks as “a man whom no man is bold enough to denounce as a toper.” He then describes the action:

It appears to have been the plan to advance the line of skirmishers from the brow of the hill, where they had been since early morning, down to the edge of the creek & see what effect this would have upon the enemy. But Gen Brooks’s aids were for making a strike & it was Capt Reed of Brooks’s staff who issued the order to our Col for us to charge upon the Rebel works, and I do not believe it ever came from any higher source. When we came back & formed in line on the grounds we had left, Gen Brooks rode along & asked us how our ammunition was. On being told that it was wet he replied that it was “all wrong, all wrong” he “never intended to have us go into the water so as to wet our boxes” showing that he intended to have us go down to & perhaps into the edge of the water. But the fact that Gen McClellan had issued express orders against bringing on a general engagement makes it absurd to suppose that we would be ordered to make so bold a push.

I cannot so easily account for the subsequent push of Col Lord [6th Vermont], though I think the object was the same—to draw their fire & learn their strength in another position. It thus becomes evident why no troops were sent across to sustain us & it now is plainly evident that had the entire Brigade been pushed forward, it would have been a bloody slaughter as the enemy had two batteries of three or four guns each so arranged that as we advanced we would have been completely annihilated by a murderous crossfire. The woods in front of us was full of batteries and rifle pits, but the guns were so placed that they could not be brought to bear upon the creek, showing conclusively that they expected no attack from that quarter. Why they ever evacuated so strong a position is a mystery yet to be solved. And yet it is believed that before this time they would have been forced either to evacuate or surrender. Would it have been the latter then we were confident of soon bringing the war to a close.

“Chasing Rebels is tiresome business,” he wrote. He was hopeful that McClellan’s army could bag the rebels in Richmond, but feared they would slip down further south. The troops were “daily engaged in skirmishes with the enemy” and the author described a humorous situation when some nearby firing caused him to “pick up my duds thinking the enemy was upon us,” but it had only been pickets discharging their rifles as they returned to camp. After relating some personal issues, he closes the letter “hoping that by the middle of summer we might be at home, but at present the prospect looks rather dubious unless we can bag the whole thing at Richmond.” The letter was written on ten pages covering two and one half sheets of lined paper measuring about 5” x 8”. Little foxing or toning. Creased at the original mailing folds. There are two staple holes near the left edge, but these have minimal impact. The full transcript follows:

On the way to Richmond
Sunday P.M. May 11th

Dear Father
Your favor of the 3rd inst. is just received. You may imagine how, thankfully, when I tell you that we have not yet been paid & are not likely to be for a long time yet to come. I was out of money & have been for a long time, & out of paper, stamps, & envelopes. All the way I’ve been able to write since the 23rd April was by begging [for] not merely one but all of these. Now I am all right whether we are paid or not, for a while at least. And now here goes for the first letter on my new paper from home, there being an opportunity to write as we are laying by for a Sabbath Day’s rest while the enemy is at bay. When I last wrote you from near Fort Magruder I had no time to enter into details of any kind. If I made no allusion to the intelligence of Mr. Newton’s death. It was not that I failed to recognize the loss of a kind neighbor & steadfast friend for such I believe he has always been to you. At first I could hardly comprehend that he was dead whom I had left but a short time ago in the enjoyment of robust health. And then I remembered that he was not after all a remarkably healthy man, & even if he was the strongest man is liable to fall at any moment. I am glad, however, to hear of his last great charge. It must be a great consolation to his family & his friends.

Mr. Dewing, also, is another man whose loss must be deeply felt in the society in which he moved, as well as in the home circle. Who can tell whose turn will come next.

Warwick Creek & the charge of the Green Mountain Boys are themes which will not soon be forgotten & I am proud that I was among the number engaged. But there was wrong idea gone out to the world. You must know that there is rivalry & envy & hate in the army & among the officers of the army as well as in every vocation of life. Now it so happens that Gen Smith is a special favorite with McClellan—a sufficient cause to bring down upon his head the combined jealousy of all other Generals of the Department in these days of degenerate morals. If Gen Smith commits a blunder or if his plans prove a failure, no one stops to enquire what adverse circumstances might have operated against him or how far it was in his power to control those circumstances; but the facts are at once seized upon & the blunder or the failure as the case may be, magnified by each repetition, is hurled out before the public with all the venom & maliciousness of envious partisans who feel conscious of their own inferiority & are ready to avail themselves of any means to crush their rival.

Now Gen Smith is a man of talent from the highest branch of our military service & a man in whom, but for one thing, the officers & men under him place implicit confidence. And here comes the rub—we all know that he is given somewhat to the flask. This is true. I will not attempt to conceal nor try to palliate the fact but that on the 16th April he was drunk & thus pushed us into the snare, I do not believe. And indeed, I think I can prove to you beyond a doubt that such was not the fact. Gen Brooks is a man whom no man is bold enough to denounce as a toper. It is even said that should a man offer to treat him he would knock him down. And it is Gen Brooks, not Gen Smith, who commands the Vermont Brigade. Whatever orders come to us from Gen Smith as Commander of the Division must come through Gen Brooks & in no other way. Now Gen Brooks was on the field commanding the Brigade in person through the entire day & he denies ever having given any orders for us to push across the creek. Thus you will see that no such order could have emanated from Smith, else Brooks would ave been cognizant of such order, & it must have been reissued by him or would not have come to us.

It appears to have been the plan to advance the line of skirmishers from the brow of the hill, where they had been since early morning, down to the edge of the creek & see what effect this would have upon the enemy. But Gen Brooks’s aids were for making a strike & it was Capt Reed of Brooks’s staff who issued the order to our Col for us to charge upon the Rebel works, and I do not believe it ever came from any higher source. When we came back & formed in line on the grounds we had left, Gen Brooks rode along & asked us how our ammunition was. On being told that it was wet he replied that it was “all wrong, all wrong” he “never intended to have us go into the water so as to wet our boxes” showing that he intended to have us go down to & perhaps into the edge of the water. But the fact that Gen McClellan had issued express orders against bringing on a general engagement makes it absurd to suppose that we would be ordered to make so bold a push.

I cannot so easily account for the subsequent push of Col Lord, though I think the object was the same—to draw their fire & learn their strength in another position. It thus becomes evident why no troops were sent across to sustain us & it now is plainly evident that had the entire Brigade been pushed forward, it would have been a bloody slaughter as the enemy had two batteries of three or four guns each so arranged that as we advanced we would have been completely annihilated by a murderous crossfire. The woods in front of us was full of batteries and rifle pits, but the guns were so placed that they could not be brought to bear upon the creek, showing conclusively that they expected no attack from that quarter. Why they ever evacuated so strong a position is a mystery yet to be solved. And yet it is believed that before this time they would have been forced either to evacuate or surrender. Would it have been the latter then we were confident of soon bringing the war to a close.

But this chasing Rebels is tiresome business. I am growing weary of camp life & long to be free from it. If we only can corner & bay them up at Richmond we may yet soon be free, but I am fearful they will escape us there & retreat farther south. We are now about thirty miles below Richmond & nearly opposite West Point, the head of navigation on York River. Our advance is daily engaged in skirmishes with the enemy. While I have been writing I have heard the roar of cannon in the distance & once when the Pickets (coming in) discharged their pieces, I wiped my pen in haste & began to pick up my duds thinking the enemy was upon us. They say we are liable to be attacked by roving bands though our advance is ten or twelve miles ahead.

I don’t know what to say about your affairs in connection with Mr. Newton’s estate. I’ll think it over & write again soon. The boys were both well last night—to tell the truth I’ve been pretty hard up for the past month. Monday I was entirely played out else I should have been with the regiment when they went to assist Hancock but I am feeling better for a day or two. I think before long I will be all right again but this marching is hard. Geo

Thank the Deacon from me for his compliment to the Vermont boys. May you all never have occasion to be less proud of us than now.

The following is a list of letters written & received from home since leaving Camp Griffin:

Written: March 8 Charles
“ 18 John
“ 22 Charles
“ 31 John
April 6 Mother
“ 10 John
“ 18 Father
“ 25 Charles
“ 27 (with James)
May 7 Father
“ 11 Father

Received Mar 21 Charles & Father
April 10 John
“ 22 Charles
“ 28 John
May 7 Father
“ 11 Father & John

These are all I have credited & I think they are all I have received. If you have written oftener than usual & these are all I have received, it is almost strange that this last with the stamps and the package came safe. Meantime, I hope the box of sugar is on the way—am awful hungry for a taste. I do hope that before another sugar season we shall have this cursed war closed up. I had been hoping that by the middle of summer we might be at home, but at present the prospect looks rather dubious unless we can bag the whole thing at Richmond. I don’t know what Fremont is doing. If I knew he was working well around to the south I should feel better about it but the prospect of another chase is anything but pleasant.

Remember me to all friends & write soon & often. George

I send my satin grammar by the same mail which carries this letter. Also an ambrotype if I can devise any way of doing it up securely. The picture was taken last winter at Camp Griffin. The case is somewhat damaged by getting damp in my knapsack.